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EITHER YOU'RE WITH US OR
AGAINST US:
No ROOM FOR THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST
James L Huffinant
Is Bjorn Lomborg the David Horowitz of environmental poli-
tics? Is he an Uncle Tom who has turned his back on the cause of
environmental protection and joined forces with those bent on en-
vironmental destruction? Silly questions to be sure (does anyone
really believe there are people bent on destroying the environ-
ment?), but the reaction to Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmen-
talist' from both environmentalists and scientists makes clear that
the environmental debate is more about loyalty to a cause than the
pursuit of scientific truth. In the world of modem environmental
politics, there must be right and wrong - good and evil - those
who seek to protect the environment and those who seek to destroy
it.
Without suggesting, as others have, that radical environmen-
talism is more about religion than science,2 we should not be sur-
prised at the reaction among mainstream environmentalists to
Lomborg's book. Environmental politics is precisely that: it is
politics. It does not so much matter what the truth is, but rather
what people perceive the truth to be. Challenges to accepted
truths, which The Skeptical Environmentalist is, are inevitably up-
t Dean and Erskine Wood Sr. Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; BS, Mon-
tana State University; MA, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; JD, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
I BJiORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD (Cambridge University Press 2001) (1998). Lomborg's statement that "[w]e all
care for the environment" is surely true, but, as I suggest at the outset, environmental politics
requires that we draw lines in the sand between those who really care and those who just claim
to care - those who embrace the litany and those who do not. Id. at 333.
2 See Robert H. Nelson, Bruce Babbitt, Pipeline to the Almighty, WEEKLY STANDARD,
June 24, 1996 (arguing that the environmental movement resonates with cultural Protestantism,
that Judeo-Christian themes are at the base of the movements values, and that environmentalism
is a substitute for religious institutions).
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setting to those whose political agendas have been well served by
those accepted truths.
Notwithstanding these realities of environmental politics, we
might reasonably hope for the intervention of a modicum of reason
in response to The Skeptical Environmentalist because of the re-
markable care with which Lomborg has done his work. He has
provided extensive references in support of his conclusions and,
more importantly, has relied heavily on the same sources used by
those whose conclusions he has challenged. Lomborg's book will
either influence the direction of environmental policy, or it will be
ignored to the detriment of sustainable environmental protection.
Lomborg's indictment of mainstream environmentalism cen-
ters around what he calls the "litany."3 The litany is the collection
of factual assertions about the condition of the environment that
Lomborg demonstrates are often exaggerated if not completely
false.4 The use of the term litany might imply religion, but for
Lomborg it suggests only that many of the central facts of envi-
ronmental advocacy are second, third and fourth hand repetitions
of ultimately unsupported claims; taken as if on faith not because
they Tromise redemption, but because they promise political vic-
tory.
While Lomborg does not speculate about the interesting ques-
tion of why these assertions of truth persist in the face of contrary
evidence, he is more than persuasive in demonstrating that they do.
From Silent Spring to Love Canal to Frankenfoods, the litany of
accepted truths has little to do with the facts as best we know
them. It seems that early hypotheses about the causes of environ-
mental harm become persistent facts without regard to the evi-
dence that emerges from subsequent tests of the hypotheses.
But it is not just a question of which claim about the environ-
ment is first out of the box. Human psychology seems to give long
life to claims that catastrophe looms, while short to no life to
claims that the future is bright. As Lomborg notes, "environmental
organizations hav[e] ... an interest in portraying the world as
gloom and doom.",6 He quotes Greenpeace in support: "The truth
is that many environmental issues we fought for ten years back are
as good as solved. Even, so, the strategy continues to focus on the
3 .LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 3. Lomborg's Litany is that: (1) the environment is in poor
shape; (2) the earth's resources are running out; (3) population growth is leaving less and less to
eat; and (4) the air and water are becoming ever more polluted. See id. at 4.
4 Id. at 4-5.
I d. at 38.
6 Id. at 39.
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assumption that 'everything is going to hell.' ' '7 We have seen the
same phenomena in the politics of civil rights where Blacks and
others have made enormous strides, yet every instance of disparate
impact is assumed to be the result of rampant and pervasive dis-
crimination. In the politics of crisis response, there is little room
for progress.
Policies in most areas of government concern will benefit sig-
nificantly if we come to better understand the phenomena of per-
sistent "truths." If the litany of environmental truths could some-
how be made to reflect our changing knowledge about the source
and nature of environmental harms, environmental politics would
permit the enactment of more effective environmental policies, and
thus popular perceptions of truth would more closely correspond to
the facts as best we know them. Although Lomborg does not con-
cern himself with why people are quick to accept these "truths"
and slow to let them go, he does suggest several reasons why envi-
ronmental politics sustains the litany.
I. LITTLE WHITE LIES
To some degree, the continued assertion of doubtful or refuted
claims of fact is purposeful. Particularly in the wake of the Clin-
ton Administration, it is generally thought acceptable to tell little
white lies, if the telling advances a greater good. It may not be
true that acid rain has devastating impacts on forests, as Lomborg
asserts,8 but continued restrictions on sulfur emissions does mean
less pollution, and that is good. There may be absolutely no basis
for the repeated assertion that 40 thousand species go extinct each
year, 9 but greater protection of natural habitat means less devel-
opment, and that is a good.
As Lomborg points out, it is commonplace for environmental
advocates to focus on a very particular issue having popular appeal
for the purpose of achieving much broader and more controversial
ends. 10 Illustrative is the experience with the Northern Spotted
Owl in the Pacific Northwest. Early research suggested that Spot-
ted Owls require old growth forests for survival. ' Although most
7 Id. at 18.
8 See id. at 178-81 (arguing the impact of acid rain is much less than initially thought).
9 See id. at 252 (arguing that the assertion is based on speculation and circular reasoning).
1o See id. at 322 (arguing that funds spent to mitigate global warming are basically a po-
litical project to enrich future inhabitants of the Third World).
11 See, e.g., Mark Bonnett & Kurt Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endan-
gered Species Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 111 (1991) (finding
that most studies demonstrate a close connection between the Northern Spotted Owl and old-
growth forests).
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environmentalists had never seen a Spotted Owl, they were quick
to recognize that protection of the species would require preserva-
tion of the old growth forests, long an objective of many environ-
mental groups.' When subsequent research indicated that Spotted
Owls seemed to be thriving in second growth forests, the accepted
truth remained that the species would become extinct if existing
old growth habitat was not preserved. 13 Because the Endangered
Species Act has provided frequent surrogates for ends unrelated to
species protection, there are added incentives to ignore evidence
that challenges the litany.
The purposeful manipulation of facts is made easy by the na-
ture and complexity of environmental relationships and the human
tendency to focus on immediate experience. Much environmental
science seeks to determine the relationship between a particular
substance or action and the environment. Such studies are critical
to expanding our understanding, but they seldom provide sufficient
evidence to reach conclusions about causation. The complex mul-
titude of factors affecting the environment makes it very difficult
to determine what is causing what.14 In most cases it will be a
combination of factors, the manipulation of any one of which may
yield unexpected and difficult to predict results. The popular ten-
dency to conclude that unusually hot weather proves that human
activity has caused global warming is illustrative of the problem.'
5
It is a popular tendency easily exploited by those who would advo-
cate the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions for reasons unre-
lated to a concern for global climate change.'
6
As Lomborg demonstrates on several occasions, trend data is
easily manipulated by one's choice of the time span and starting
and ending dates for study.' 7 By tracking the height of my son
from birth to seven years of age I might conclude that he will be
seven feet six inches tall when he is sixteen. Of course he will not,
and I will have difficulty persuading colleges that they should re-
cruit him now to play center on the basketball team ten years from
now. The basketball coach has sufficient experience to know that
12 Id. at 107.
11 See, e.g., Sighting in Second-Growth Forest Stirs Debate, GREENWIRE, June 7, 1995
(quoting Jack Cox, press secretary for Rep. Charles Taylor (R-NC), who claimed that more and
more spotted owls were being found in second-growth areas); Bruce Barcott, From Tree-
Hugger to Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 6 (Magazine) at 56 (arguing that old-growth
forests are essential to the survival of the spotted owl).
14 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 331.
15 See id. at 292.
16 See id. at 305.
17 Id. at 27 ("One of the main rhetorical figures of the environmental movement is to pass
off a temporary truism as an important indicator of decline.").
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children do not continue to grow at the same rate or indefinitely.
But most people, including most policy makers, do not have suffi-
cient experience or knowledge to know when they are being hood-
winked about environmental trends.
Lomborg observes that there is fear where there should be op-
timism.' 8 Although there is a wide variation among individuals in
their tolerance for risk, people in general seem to be fairly risk
averse. One of the classics of environmental literature warned
against crying wolf about wolves,' 9 but because it is a lesson hard
to learn, crying wolf has been an effective strategy for environ-
mentalists. A recent and costly example of crying wolf is the
European reaction to genetically modified foods which is not only
driving biotech companies and scientists out of Europe,20 but is
also depriving millions of starving and hungry people of healthy
and safe foods. When such hysteria spills over into nations like
Zambia, where millions starve while genetically modified foods
are forbidden, the consequences of irrational fear are tragic.2'
But fear has proven to be a very effective political tool, diffi-
cult for environmentalists to resist even when they know that the
risks are negligible. A related political strategy is the tendency to
simplify environmental issues in a way to make political adversar-
ies either pro- or anti-environmental.22 As Lomborg points out,
everyone cares about the environment,23 but one would not know it
from the tenor of environmental policy debates. Those who chal-
lenge the litany of truths or suggest alternative approaches to envi-
ronmental protection are labeled anti-environmentalists to signifi-
cant political effect.24
II. LAW & POLITICS'
While there are incentives in the political process for little
white lies, and worse lies about the state of the environment, the
nature of our political and legal processes also contribute to the
exaggeration and distortion of environmental truth. Notwithstand-
ing the growth of alternative dispute resolution over the past two
18 Id. at 331.
19 See FARLEY MOWAT, NEVER CRY WOLF (1963).
20 See LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 343.
21 Africa's Hungry Aren't Picky, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Editorial, Sept. 17, 2002,
at 8 (arguing that in Zambia, the people facing famine do not care about the theoretical risks of
genetically modified foods).
22 Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 28, 2001) (interviewing
Karen Hughes on the perception of Pres. George W. Bush as being anti-environment).
23 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 333.
24 See, e.g., id. at 32 ("Not only are we familiar with the Litany, and know it to be true.
We also know that anyone who claims anything else must have disturbingly evil intentions.").
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decades, our legal system remains one in which there are winners
and losers. Either a defendant is liable or not, and, the answer to
that question depends on findings of fact. In the civil justice sys-
tem the standard is low - more probable than not. It is little won-
der that every side in virtually every dispute can secure expert tes-
timony in support of their version of the truth. The finder of fact
will determine one version of the truth to be more probable than
the others, but this probability will be understood and articulated
as virtual certainty. The parallels between scientific truth and le-
gal findings of fact is underscored by recurrent proposals for sci-
ence courts,25 as if the uncertainties inherent in scientific study can
somehow be eliminated by legal process.
There is some irony in the fact that advocates of a science
court have sought to use the legal process to resolve questions of
scientific uncertainty, while environmentalists and advocates of
many other causes have appealed to science to resolve questions of
political uncertainty.26 Of course we cannot have it both ways, or
for that matter, either way. The law cannot get us closer to scien-
tific certainty, and science cannot resolve political disagreements.
Lomborg is quite correctly at pains to make clear that science is
one thing; politics another.27 Science is often critical to informing
political decisions, but neither science nor the personal preferences
of scientists should have anything in particular to contribute to po-
litical choices.
Although very different from the legal system, the political
process also encourages the over-simplification of complicated
questions of science. Special interests tend to have narrow agen-
das, which give little if any consideration to other interests.28 The
measure of the politician is his or her position on these special in-
terests rather than a capacity for an integrated analysis of the mul-
titude of agendas that combine in our heterogeneous politics.
29
The politician who says that things are complicated and will re-
quire more research and thought is not likely to prevail over the
25 See generally Jon R. Cavicchi, The Science Court: A Bibliography, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN
HEALTH & SAFETY 171 (1993) (presenting a list of references primarily focused on the science
court).
26 See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr., Pursuing Transparency Through Science Courts, 11
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 209, 212-13 (2000) (highlighting the key features
of the science court and how it would fit in with public policy).
27 LOMBORG, supra note I, at 328.
28 See id. at 38 (expressing the idea that political organizations base their decisions on a
desire to benefit their members).
29 See Jonathan R. Macey, A Symposium Commemorating the Bicentennial of the United
States Constitution: Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50
(1987) (describing the relationship between political success and special interests).
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politician willing to take a position notwithstanding uncertainty:
either there is climate change or there is not climate change;30 ei-
ther drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge will threaten
the Arctic ecosystem or it will only impact on a few hundred
acres;3 1 special interest politics leaves little room for waffling on
the facts.
Lomborg notes that we often regulate small risks while ignor-
ing much larger risks.3 1 Although this is partly a function of the
psychological "tendency to underestimate large risks and to over-
estimate small ones," 33 it is also a product of the political pressure
to take clear and simple positions on complicated questions. Be-
cause the political process takes one issue at a time, with "big
bang" events having priority without regard to real risks, the focus
is inevitably on the political consequences of action rather than on
maximizing net social welfare and safety.34 With these political
incentives, knowing the truth is less important than claiming to
know the truth.
III. COMPLEXITY & UNCERTAINTY
Even without the purposeful distortions of fact and the pres-
sures of the legal and political systems to simplify facts, we find it
difficult to resist the litany because of the enormous complexity of
the questions we face. Life goes on and decisions must be made.
As has often been said, inaction is action. On issues like climate
change and biotechnology, uncertainties abound and will for the
foreseeable future. But even our neighborhood ecosystem is com-
plex, if not beyond our understanding, certainly beyond our ability
to manage. Seldom have human beings evidenced greater hubris
than in proposing to engage in ecosystem management on a large
scale. Perhaps there will be a time when the combination of our
understanding and computers capable of processing vast quantities
of data about countless variables will permit ecosystem manage-
ment, but for the present we deceive ourselves in claiming that we
know and can process the necessary facts.
10 Id.
31 See generally http://www.anwr.org (2002) (providing information about the effects of
drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge).
32 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 337.
33 Id. at 336.
34 The "big bang" phenomenon has been described in the context of such things as natural
disasters and airplane crashes. Although loss of life per mile traveled is far less from plane
crashes than from auto accidents, it is much easier to get political response in the wake of hun-
dreds of deaths than in the wake of one or two deaths. Earthquakes cause far fewer deaths than
winter storms, for example, but the big bang nature of an earthquake elicits more political atten-
tion and public resources than do winter storms. See id. at 336-38.
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Not only is the environment complex beyond our understand-
ing, but it is constantly changing, as are our human circumstances.
And as environmentalists have long pointed out, everything seems
to be connected to everything else.35 It is like a waterbed. You
push down here and it pops up there, but there is no way to predict
where there is. The law of unintended consequences affects not
only human actions that impact on the environment, but also hu-
man efforts to mitigate those impacts. For instance, we can regu-
late DDT in the interest of protecting avian reproduction, while
simultaneously causing a catastrophic impact on the battle against
malaria.36  We can regulate greenhouse gas emissions, while
simultaneously making energy too costly for the poor to afford.37
This is not to argue against environmental regulation, but to
argue in favor of humility as we pursue that regulation. The litany
that Lomborg describes gives us false confidence in our actions.
The history of science proves that we know a lot more today than
we did in the past, but also that much of what we know today will
be proven wrong tomorrow. 38 In most cases we are not so wrong
that we have been going 180 degrees in the wrong direction, but
wrong enough that we need always to be open to modifications of
our approach.
But even if we have the understanding and the capacity to
process the data, we do not have the governmental institutions to
accomplish the sophisticated prioritizations that Lomborg says are
necessary. As in our individual lives, constant adjustment to im-
proving knowledge, changing circumstances, and evolving values
requires us to be nimble and flexible. But the political process is
ponderous, particularly in the United States where it has been
made cumbersome by design. 39 So we are easily tempted to em-
brace the litany as reassurance that we are doing the right thing.
Whatever the reasons for the widespread acceptance of the lit-
any, it is difficult to argue that it does not exist in the face of Lom-
borg's comprehensive and careful analysis. It is also difficult to
challenge Lomborg's prescriptions for what needs to be done be-
yond questioning the many truths of the litany.
-5 See MILTON RUSSELL, EVALUATING ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAME-
WORK 31-40 (1990) available at http://www.nap.edu/books/O309042933/html31.html (explain-
ing the environmentalist theory of connection).
36 See, e.g., JOSEPH L. BAST, ET AL., EcO-SANITY: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO ENVI-
RONMENTALISM 91 (Madison Books 1994).
37 See, e.g., John Peterson, Global Warming Policies Could Unfairly Harm Minorities and
the Poor, National Policy Analysis, at http://nationalcenter.org/NPA357.htm (Sept. 2001).
38 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 330.
19 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Still the Framers' Constitution?, at
http://www.common-place.org (July 2002).
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IV. BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
We should base our environmental policies on the facts rather
than fear, says Lomborg.40 This seems self-evident, but recent ac-
tions in the courts have promoted the conflicting idea that regula-
tion and liability are warranted in response to fear, even when
there is no factual basis for that fear.4' While it is surely true that
people suffer real harm from fear, the regulation of nonhazardous
activity to reduce fear, or the awarding of damages for irrational
fear, will have disastrous consequences for intelligent environ-
mental regulation. It will magnify the political returns of fear
mongering and will greatly reduce incentives for objective re-
search and the communication of reliable and accurate informa-
tion .42
We should learn to prioritize better not only our environ-
mental objectives, but also all of the many things we ask govern-
ment to do. Some environmentalists still urge zero pollution or its
equivalent as a policy objective,43 but it is difficult to imagine any
circumstance in which zero pollution is a defensible objective for
human societies. We might aspire to zero pollution (from human
activities) in nature preserves from which humans will be ex-
cluded, butsuch preserves are not the stuff of human subsidence,
not to mention prosperity. Wherever humans live, work and play,
some amount of pollution is unavoidable. Indeed, the better way
to think about the problem, as William Baxter explained many
years ago, is that some level of pollution is optimal. 44 Only by
understanding and implementing our priorities will we determine
that optimal level, but we can rest assured that it will never be
zero.Those who argue that we should protect the environment
without regard to cost are not only insisting that environmental
values should trump all others, but also that the particular envi-
ronmental objective on which they propose to spend is more im-
portant than other environmental objectives on which the resources
might be spent. "Such an understanding," says Lomborg, "...
prevents prioritizing between environmental problems, . . .[and]
40 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 327.
41 For example, the many pending asbestos cases include plaintiffs without any symptoms
of asbestosis but who seek to recover for the harm they suffer from the fear they might contract
the malady.
42 See id. at 331.
41 James L. Huffman, Protecting the Environment from Orthodox Environmentalism,
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 363 (1992).
44 WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 11-12
(1974).
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hinders prioritizing between the environment and all other essen-
tial areas of society ....
Lomborg is undeniably correct when he says "[a]ll decisions
are in reality a trade-off of various risks. 46 The challenge is in
creating the institutional structure and processes to best accom-
plish the prioritization implicit in evaluating such trade-offs. On
this point, Lomborg offers little in the way of help, although he
does not pu~ort to have any particular expertise on either law or
government. 7 He does embrace democracy and urges the impor-
tance of good information to democratic decision-making, but the
challenge of prioritization, at least in the United States, may be as
much a result of too much democracy, as of too little reliable in-
formation.
V. THE OPTIMISTIc DEMOCRAT
Democracy, whether the special interest variety practiced at
the national and state levels or the more direct variety sometimes
practiced at the local level, creates incentives for information dis-
tortion as suggested above. Special interests exaggerate their
claims in hopes of favorable compromise, while individuals faced
with particular policy questions will have no basis to assess their
real priorities. Even if individuals are presented with a menu of
abstract alternatives purporting to be the universe of trade-offs,
their decisions will be equally abstract absent the relatively imme-
diate prospect of real costs and benefits to the individual.48 And
even if we know the full range of trade-offs, which we seldom if
ever do, it is never practical to present all of them to the individual
voter.49 Voters vote on particular measures in the form of initia-
tives and referenda, or they elect representatives based either on a
single position a candidate supports or on the candidate's general
approach to government. 50
45 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 331.
46 Id. at 336.
47 Early on Lomborg does indicate that he understands the apparently not so obvious truth
about public resource allocation: "If we want to improve one thing, such as Third World access
to clean drinking water, we need to take the resources from others areas where we would also
like to make things better. Naturally, this is the essence of politics - we have to prioritize re-
sources and choose some projects over many others." Id. at 6. Lomborg's only mistake is in
assuming that with better information we will easily accomplish this political prioritization
through democratic institutions.
48 See id. at 336.
49 See generally KIM EZRA SHEINBAUM, BEYOND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION: A RE-
ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF VOTING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 33 (1984).
50 See, e.g., id. at 22.
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I...'If Lomborg takes the view that better information and less lit-
any will permit democracies to make optimal environmental deci-
sions, I believe he is overly optimistic. If his claim is only that
democratic decision-making will be better with better information
than it is with the litany, he is surely correct. 51 But the improve-
ment will be marginal at best.
The problem of prioritization among environmental objec-
tives, not to mention the challenge of prioritization among all pub-
lic concerns, is that the institutions of government regulation and
management are better suited to wealth redistribution than to effi-
cient resource allocation. The recurrent complaint that politics has
been allowed to intervene in the pursuit of the public good 52 (it is
usually one side accusing the other of politicizing an issue) is
transparent nonsense. Government is politics. That is the point of
public, as opposed to private, decision-making. It might be
claimed, for example, that an existing level of pollution is ineffi-
cient and therefore should be regulated,53 but the political contest
over the proposed regulation will be largely about wealth distribu-
tion - that is, will the polluters pay the cost of cleanup or will oth-
ers continue to bear the cost of exposure to pollution. 54 There is
little in the governmental process that will help society get closer
to determining what level of pollution is best for society.
That is why it is often argued that many environmental ques-
tions should be left to science. But as Lomborg points out, science
cannot resolve the public policy question. Scientists can provide
their best predictions about the consequences of alternative courses
of action, but the choice among courses has nothing to do with sci-
ence. 55 It has to do with human preferences. When we resort to
government to choose among the competing preferences of a large
and diverse society, the special interest politics of wealth redistri-
bution cannot be avoided. Some governments will be more effec-
tive than others at expanding the range of preferences that are
heard and listened to, but widespread public participation does not
change the fact that politics, whether democratic or autocratic, is
largely about the distribution and redistribution of wealth.56
51 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 5.
52 Cf id. at 336.
53 Huffman, supra note 43, at 363.
54 See generally LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 6.
55 Id. at 5.
56 Id. at 6.
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VI. MARKETS & THE RULE OF LAW
So if we are interested in prioritization in the sense of maxi-
mizing net social welfare, and if Lomborg is too optimistic about
democracy, what is the alternative? One alternative is greater reli-
ance on private institutions, particularly property and contract. Of
course property and contract depend upon government to set and
enforce the rules. But government must do so without second-
guessing the choices made by individuals, in order to minimize the
opportunities for wealth redistribution (rent-seeking). Politics,
however, will invite second-guessing, which is why we have con-
stitutional protections like due process, equal protection, and pro-
hibitions on impairment of contracts and takings of property.
Lomborg does not have much to say about these institutional
questions (which are not really the subject of his book), but he
does suggest on occasion that property rights and the rule of law
are important.17 Indeed the rule of law is important if we are inter-
ested in some alternative to the politics of public regulation and
management. The rule of law is what requires adherence to due
process and restrains second-guessing of existing rules of property
and contract.
The obvious alternative to regulation and public management
is private decision-making in the context of markets. Although
part of the litany of environmentalism has long been that private,
self-interested, decision-making is a major cause of environmental
harm, free market environmentalists have made some headway
over the past decade. 8 The idea that market transactions can im-
prove environmental conditions, even if the market is dependent
upon regulation to establish the available supply of particular re-
sources, has gained adherents even among some mainline envi-
59ronmental groups. Where this has occurred it does not reflect a
sudden conversion to free market ideology (some would say relig-
ion), rather it reflects the pragmatic judgment that environmental
objectives can sometimes be better achieved, or realized at less
cost, through private transactions than through regulation. The
willingness of some mainstream environmental groups to advocate
market solutions in the face of a strong environmentalist bias
against markets underscores the principle contribution of markets
to maximizing net social welfare.6° When one is required to pay
the costs of one's choices with the recognition that there are
57 See id. at 107 (property rights), 330 (rule of law).
58 Huffman, supra note 43, at 351.
59 Id. at 353.
6 Id.
[Vol. 53:391
EITHER YOU'RE WITH US OR AGAINST US
opoportunity costs to every choice, there is an incentive to get the
best information possible on the benefits to be realized.61
Although personal experience, and the sometimes vicious re-
action to Lomborg's book,62 suggest that it will make little differ-
ence, I hasten to say that markets are not the be all and end all for
environmental protection. Nor does Lomborg make any such
claim.63 Free marketeers have their own litany that also skews
thoughtful evaluation of alternative institutional arrangements for
the allocation of scarce resources. 64 That litany is driven by the
persistent need to engage in politics, by way of assuring that gov-
ernment provides the institutional arrangements necessary for the
creation and enforcement of contract and property rights.65  As a
result, politics promotes litanies on both sides of the environmental
regulation debate.
It is reading between the lines (and beyond) to suggest that
Lomborg's book is at heart a total rejection of environmental regu-
lation.66 Whether or not regulation in the abstract is an appropriate
method for the pursuit of environmental protection is not a central
theme of the book. Lomborg is critical of specific regulations be-
cause they are founded on not very good or accurate information,
but this is a far cry from an overarching, ideological opposition to
regulation.
67
VII. KILLING THE MESSENGER
Much of the criticism of Lomborg's book seems to take the
view that rather than being a committed environmentalist in search
of better and more defensible environmental policies, he is a sort
of ideological convert, if not a traitor.68 It is argued that his book
is not balanced in the sense that he does not adequately acknowl-
61 See id. at 356.
62 See generally David Schoenbrod, The Mau-Mauing of Bjorn Lomborg, 114 COMMEN-
TARY, Sept. 2002 at 51, 52-53.
63 Indeed, Lomborg resorts to italics to emphasize that, for example, the low risk of cancer
from pesticide use "does not mean that we can just ignore pollution or should dismiss political
action, but it does indicate the degree of worry we should attach to pollution." LOMBORG,
supra note 1, at 335-36.
64 See generally Huffman, supra note 43, at 336-37 (stating that free market environmen-
talism suffers in the evaluation of resource allocation institutions because it has characteristics,
such as individual choice and profits, that are assumed to result in detrimental environmental
decisions).
65 See id. at 357.
66 Cf Schoenbrod, supra note 62, at 52 (noting that Lomborg does not assert that the
environment is in perfect shape; rather, he acknowledges the need for improvement in certain
areas).
67 See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 348 (acknowledging risk of GM technology and
the need for a "strong regulation system" based on sound science).
68 See generally Schoenbrod, supra note 62, at 53.
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edge the contributions environmental regulation have made to the
positive trends he describes.69 Perhaps this is fair, although most
of the trends he catalogues predate by decades if not centuries the
era of environmental regulation.7 ° Even within the last three or
four decades of aggressive environmental regulation it is by no
means clear how much of the progress has been the result of regu-
lation and how much would have occurred in any event. Indeed,
there are plausibly some measures of environmental progress that
have been retarded by environmental regulation. 7' But assuming
that modern environmental regulation gets some or even most of
the credit for the positive trends on which Lomborg reports, his
central point that we need to better prioritize remains.72 We may
have made environmental progress through regulation, but if we
could have made greater progress through better informed regula-
tion or through nonregulatory means, Lomborg's critique remains
compelling.
It is argued that Lomborg's litany is long dead and that mod-
ern environmentalists are much more sophisticated in their ap-
proach.73 No doubt some are, but John Erhlich, Rachel Carson,
Barry Commoner and even Thomas Malthus remain patron saints
of environmentalism notwithstanding that their predictions have
been proven wrong again and again. 74 And it is not just the de-
ceased and gray beards whose ideas constitute the litany. Few
have been more apocalyptic than former Vice President Al Gore in
his Earth in the Balance,75 yet his ideas have been widely and en-
thusiastically embraced by environmentalists. Lomborg demon-
strates that an environmental apocalypse is about as likely as envi-
ronmentalists agreeing that Julian Simon had it right, after all.
Regrettably, Lomborg's fate with environmentalists is almost sure
to be the same as Simon's fate. Lomborg naively suggests that his
19 See Michael Grubb, Relying on Manna from Heaven?, 294 SCIENCE 1285, 1285-86
(2001) (book review).
70 See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 50-51 (higher life expectancy), 54-59 (less ill-
ness), 60 (more food), 70-71 (increased prosperity).
71 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protec-
tion, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 654-55 (2001) (noting that the federal Superfund pro-
gram and the Clean Air and Endangered Species Acts stand as "the greatest obstacles to contin-
ued cleanup and conservation").
72 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 350.
73 See Grubb, supra note 69, at 1285.
74 See, e.g., John Bongaarts, Misleading Math About the Earth: Population: Ignoring its
Impact, Sci. AM., Jan. 2001, at 68 (noting that the population expanded more rapidly than Mal-
thus predicted); Grubb, supra note 69, at 1285 (commenting that Paul Ehrlich has exaggerated
the problem of food supply).
75 AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992).
[Vol. 53:391
EITHER YOU'RE WITH US OR AGAINST US
dismantling of the litany is "impossible to ignore,' '76 but anyone
who receives solicitations for support from mainline environ-
mental groups knows that the litany is alive and well, notwith-
standing the facts.
The most surprising and disheartening reactions to Lomborg's
book have come from scientists and leading scientific publications.
Both Science and Scientific American have taken him to task.7 In
a recent article in Commentary, David Schoenbrod describes the
attack on Lomborg's book (and on Lomborg) as "the very opposite
of the free give-and-take that is supposed to characterize responsi-
ble scientific discourse., 78 "In choosing to treat The Skeptical En-
vironmentalist as an attack on environmental science," says
Schoenbrod, "Lomborg's scientific critics inadvertently revealed
the degree of their own complicity with the misrepresentations and
propagandistic distortions he so skillfully exposed., 79 No doubt
scientists will object that they are not complicit in sustaining the
litany, but what else explains their vicious reaction to a book that
is largely a recounting of the facts reported by scientists?
Environmentalists of the deep ecology sort will object that
Lomborg's book is anthropocentric. But that is not a telling cri-
tique. Lomborg is no more anthropocentric than the next guy,
even when the next guy is a deep ecologist. The claim that we, or
some of us, can think about the environment from the perspective
of nonhuman organisms is hubris even beyond that of the ecosys-
tem managers. As Lomborg observes, "the extent to which pen-
guins and pine trees are considered depends in the final instance on
some (in democracies more than half of all) individuals being pre-
pared to act on their behalf .... [I]t depends on the assessment by
people."80
VIII. MORE BANG FOR THE BUCK Is HARD TO Do
Central to Lomborg's argument is the claim that resources ex-
pended on solving some environmental problems would yield far
greater returns if spent on other public needs, both environmental
76 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 341.
77 See, e.g., Grubb, supra note 69, at 1285-86; John Rennie, Editorial, Misleading Math
About the Earth, ScI. AM., Jan. 2001, at 61; Stephen Schneider, Misleading Math About the
Earth; Global Warming: Neglecting the Complexities, SCI. AM., Jan. 2001, at 62; John P. Hol-
dren, Misleading Math About the Earth; Energy: Asking the Wrong Question, Sdl. AM., Jan.
2001, at 65; Bongaarts, supra note 74, at 67; Thomas Lovejoy, Misleading Math About the
Earth; Biodiversity: Dismissing Scientific Process, Scl. AM., Jan. 2001, at 69.
78 Schoenbrod, supra note 62, at 53.
79 Id. at 54.
80 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at 12.
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and nonenvironmental. 81 He discusses the oft-cited study by the
Harvard University Center for Risk Analysis of a wide array of
public interventions to save lives.82 The core conclusion of the
study was that there is little correlation between the amount we
spend on intervention and the number of lives we can expect to
save.83 We invest far more in the mitigation of some relatively low
risks than we do in the avoidance of much higher risks.84 Lomborg
builds on this analysis to argue that we should redirect resources
invested in regulating smaller environmental risks to interventions
that will yield higher returns, like worldwide health and nutrition
programs .85
Lomborg's argument is persuasive, but a bit misleading.
While it is accurate to say we could yield higher public returns by
redirecting some of our resources to other problems, the redirec-
tion of those resources is not a simple matter. The computations
of resources invested in environmental regulation should and do
include far more than the direct governmental costs of regulation.
Included are the costs of compliance, both direct and indirect.
These costs are not easily recouped for alternative public pro-
grams. Money spent to comply with government regulation will
not magically appear in the public coffers to be spent on public
programs that yield higher returns. As Lomborg has demonstrated,
there are not many certainties in our lives, but a near certainty
must be that we will not recover the costs of regulatory compliance
86through taxation.
Although I am confident Lomborg does not intend to mislead,
it should be acknowledged that the argument for redirecting re-
sources to public actions yielding higher returns has become part
of the litany of the anti-regulators. This is not to say that Lom-
borg's point is incorrect, but only that accomplishing the realloca-
tion of resources is not a simple matter. Indeed it is a reallocation
that government can, at best, only affect indirectly. To suggest
that current expenditures on regulatory compliance can dollar for
dollar be reallocated to saving lives and feeding people is mislead-
ing, to say the least.
A reallocation of resources from avoiding relatively small en-
vironmental risks to providing food and health care to millions of
hungry and sick people will only happen through economic devel-
11 Id. at 327.
82 Id. at 338-42.
13 Id. at 339.
84 ld. at 339-41.
85 Id. at 341-42.
86 Id. at 350-52.
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opment across the globe. The connection between such economic
development and the reduction in expenditures on low return envi-
ronmental regulations is distant, but potentially real. If companies
are able to reduce expenses of environmental compliance, they will
spend little if any of the savings on food and medicine for the
poor, but they will invest in economic growth which might benefit
the poor. Governments around the world can have significant in-
fluence on whether or not new investment does benefit the poor by
encouraging free trade and local economic development. This
does, however, involve politics, so there are no guarantees.
CONCLUSION
Rather than advance our understanding of the many challeng-
ing issues of environmental policy, it seems The Skeptical Envi-
ronmentalist has become part of the debate, and Lomborg is on the
side of the black hats. This is so notwithstanding the fact that
Lomborg has convincingly demonstrated that in virtually every
respect there has been enormous progress in the human condition,
even in the most undeveloped corners of the world. Furthermore,
it is so notwithstanding that he relied entirely on the same sources
of data employed by those who see nothing but doom and gloom.
No doubt Lomborg has made a few errors of fact, although
David Schoenbrod was able to cite only a handful,87 and none of
any consequence. And no doubt Lomborg has his personal biases
and preferences, but few if any of his critics know anything about
what those might be. What we know is that he was once a Green-
peace member,8 8 the mention of which irritates his former collabo-
rators, and that he purports to have an interest in learning the facts
about the environmental state of the world. 89 Because he has done
a far more comprehensive and thorough job of researching the
facts than almost anyone, he deserves, at least, the respect of civil
discourse. If some or many of his conclusions are in error, he
should be proven wrong in the great tradition of scholarly ex-
change. But even then, he should be praised for advancing the ex-
change and thus improving our understanding.
But that is not the way of environmental politics. It would be
a shame, but not surprising, if Bjorn Lomborg returns to Denmark
in pursuit of less controversial pursuits. If he does, he can do so
with the knowledge that he has made an important contribution to
87 See Schoenbrod, supra note 62, at 54.
88 LOMBORG, supra note 1, at xix.
89 Id. at xix-xx.
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our understanding of the state of the world's environment, whether
or not we are smart enough to pay attention.
